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Abstract
This paper develops a solvable general equilibrium agglomeration
model, where search frictions for low-skilled immobile workers gener-
ate regional unemployment differentials. Contrary to other work in
this field, the model yields a higher long-run unemployment rate in
the core region. This is because low-skilled manufacturing jobs are
more valuable there and unemployment works as a compensating dif-
ferential. It therefore more closely resembles the classical result of
Harris and Todaro (1970). One main difference is that here regions
are ex ante equal. I derive expressions for the break and sustain point
and analyze the effect of search frictions on their location.
JEL-Classification: F12, J61, J64, R12
Keywords: Regional labor markets, new economic geography, job matching,
unemployment
1 Introduction
Regional unemployment differentials have become a constant target of eco-
nomic research. This is easily understandable when looking at the stark
differences in the performance of regional labor markets, even if they are lo-
cated in close proximity to each other. For example, regional unemployment
∗University of Regensburg and IAB Nu¨rnberg, e-mail: philipp.vom-berge[at]wiwi.uni-
regensburg.de
1
rates in Germany in 2005 varied between 5 and 30 percent on the NUTS-3
level. Although those rates are spatially correlated, differentials between re-
gions with contiguous borders were 2.57 percentage points on average and
reached a maximum at 14 percentage points.
While classical theory proposes that unemployment differentials should
decrease over time, a growing body of more modern agglomeration models
shows that those differentials might prevail or even increase. This helps to
explain why – depending on the specific case explored – it has often been
hard to find signs of convergence of unemployment rates.1 These models
usually build on the celebrated core-periphery model by Krugman (1991)
or one of its variations. For example, Francis (2003) uses the model by
Krugman and Venables (1995), where the presence of an intermediate goods
sector creates supply and demand linkages, thus inducing the endogenous
generation of industrial agglomeration. He then goes on to show that these
forces get even stronger when the model is extended by an efficiency wage
consideration that leads to equilibrium unemployment at the regional level.
Suedekum (2005) and Zierahn (2011) reach similar results in models that
allow for interregional labor mobility. Epifani and Gancia (2005) and Francis
(2009) develop models with interregional labor mobility where search costs
create unemployment differentials. Migration to the economic core increases
relative unemployment there in the short run, but decreases it in the long
run. In contrast to the previous literature, vom Berge (2011) argues that both
higher or lower unemployment in the core can be an equilibrium outcome of
agglomeration models. This pattern emerges when search costs are linked to
the regional wage level and unemployment benefits are set nationwide.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, earlier
models on unemployment in core-periphery settings are usually only solvable
numerically. Among the rare exceptions are the efficiency wage model of
Suedekum (2005) and the fair wage model of Egger and Seidel (2008). Here,
I develop an analytically solvable agglomeration model where search frictions
create unemployment differentials between regions. Second, the model shows
a different way to think about unemployment as a compensating differential
within a region (see Harris and Todaro, 1970). It explains how higher unem-
ployment rates in core regions might arise and also prevail, but unlike Harris
and Todaro (1970) does not assume ex ante different regions. Therefore,
the present model can also be regarded as a complement to the spatial mis-
match literature (see Gobillon et al., 2003, for an overview) or urban models
with unemployment like Zenou and Smith (1995) that try to explain high
unemployment rates in core cities.
1Elhorst (2003) provides a comprehensive overview of 41 empirical studies in the field.
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The model uses a quasi-linear function for household utility to achieve
analytical solvability. There are two sorts of labor. Some workers are mobile
between regions while others are not. The latter have to decide whether to
work in a “save” perfectly competitive sector or in a “risky” monopolistic one
where firms face search costs and some job searchers might stay out of job.
In such an environment, mobile workers will move to the region that gives
them the highest utility level and immobile workers will apply for those jobs
that give them the highest expected income, a decision that again depends
on where mobile workers settle.
The model shows that the incentive to apply for risky jobs increases when
mobile workers move into a region. As a result, the local unemployment rate
will go up. This has two effects. First, the negative effect of rising un-
employment on consumption has a detrimental effect on high-skilled wages
and weakens the strength of the agglomeration forces. Second, because any
wage effect feeds back into unemployment the wage differential between re-
gions gets narrowed. This can have a dispersive or accumulative effect on
migration.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the basic model and
states the short-run equilibrium conditions. Section 3 describes the different
forces working towards and against agglomeration and sketches their net
effect. Section 4 discusses the long-run equilibrium. Section 5 relates some of
the findings to the literature and empirical observations. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The model economy consists of two regions that only differ with respect to
the number of workers living in them. There are two kinds of labor and no
other factor of production. L gives the number of low skilled workers in the
first region, L∗ in the second. K and K∗ represent high skilled workers in
both regions, respectively. There are also two sectors in the economy. The
first sector only employs low skilled workers and produces a homogenous and
freely tradable good with constant returns to scale under perfect competition.
The second sector employs both factors producing a differentiated product
with increasing returns to scale under monopolistic competition and faces
trade costs to transport goods over regional boundaries. Low skilled workers
can decide in which sector they want apply for a job. Those in the first region
choosing the constant returns sector are denoted by LA, those choosing the
increasing returns sector by LX .
2 High skilled workers and those employed
2For ease of exposition I only show the results for the first region. The following also
holds for the second region, this time marked with asterisks.
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in sector A face no job risk. The LX workers seeking a job in sector X are
matched to vacancies according to the constant returns technology
S = BV ηL1−ηX , (1)
where S denotes the number of successful matches, V the number of vacant
jobs, η the matching elasticity and B some constant which has to be set
properly to make sure that matching probabilities do not exceed unity. The
probability of a successful match can be written as θ = S/V for a vacant job
and ρ = S/LX for a worker and the number of unemployed workers in the
first region is given by U = LX − S.
Consumers Following the agglomeration model by Pflu¨ger (2004) the util-
ity function of a representative household is quasi-linear:
M = α logCX + CA, α > 0. (2)
CA and CX denote consumption of the goods produced by sector A and X,
respectively, where CX forms a compound of varieties of the monopolistic
sector from both regions:
CX =
[∫ N
0
x
σ−1
σ
i di+
∫ N∗
0
x
σ−1
σ
j dj
] σ
σ−1
, σ > 1 (3)
where N (N∗) is the number of different varieties produced in the home
(foreign) region, xi(xj) is the consumption of a home variety i (foreign variety
j) and σ stands for the elasticity of substitution. The household budget
constraint demands that income Y satisfies∫ N
0
pixi +
∫ N∗
0
pjxj + CA = Y (4)
where pi (pj) is the price of home (foreign) sector X goods in region 1 and
sector A is chosen to be the numeraire sector with its price level normalized
to unity. Utility maximization by the familiar two-stage budgeting reveals
that demand for the two sector aggregates is
CX = αP
−1; CA = Y − α (5)
and for each single variety
xi = αp
−σ
i P
σ−1; xj = αp−σj P
σ−1 (6)
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which shows that the parameter α represents the amount of income spent
for sector X goods. Spending on these varieties is independent of income. P
represents the price index of all goods in the increasing returns sector and is
given by
P =
[∫ N
0
p1−σi +
∫ N∗
0
p1−σj
] 1
1−σ
. (7)
Plugging (5) into (2) leads to the indirect utility function
I = −α logP + Y + [α(logα− 1)] . (8)
Firms To characterize production of sector X firms I make two simplifying
assumptions. First, there is a large group of firms so that no single firms
decision affects market prices. Second, each firm is sufficiently large so that
it does not face uncertainty with respect to the number of people it can
hire. This means a fraction θ of all posted vacancies will be actually filled.
Additionally, goods can be supplied to the other region at a certain cost
which are of the iceberg type. Thus, the price of a home variety sold in the
foreign region is higher than its original price by a factor τ , so that p∗i = τpi.
A single firms profit in the first region is given by
Πi = piXi − c
(
WX +
γ
θ
)
Xi −R (9)
where
Xi = (K + LA + S)xi + (K
∗ + L∗A + S
∗) τx∗i . (10)
The first part of (10) represents production for the first region, while the
second part shows the amount produced for the second. Production for
foreign consumer is τ times bigger than actual consumption because the
iceberg-specification assumes some of the goods to “melt” away en route.
Demand comes from all employed workers in a region, so we assume that
the unemployed have no income from benefits or savings. Costs in equation
(9) consist of three parts. First, low skilled work is a variable input in the
production process, with its input coefficient being c. The wage is denoted by
WX . Second, firms cannot expect to fill each vacancy they pose, but with a
nominal vacancy cost of γ the additional cost per hired worker is γ/θ. Third,
each firm needs one unit of high skilled work as a fixed input and pays the
wage R. Profit maximization then yields the optimal price for a variety
pi =
σ
σ − 1c
(
WX +
γ
θ
)
. (11)
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Bargaining of the low-skilled There are three more equilibrium condi-
tions to pin down low skilled wages WX , the rate of successful matches θ and
the number of unemployed workers in each region U . Low skilled workers
can decide if they want to take a job in sector A and earn a wage of 1 with
certainty, or if they want to apply for a job in sector X yielding the wage
WX . Their probability of success is ρ in the latter case, otherwise they be-
come unemployed and their income is zero. Workers are committed to their
primary decision so that a changeover of the unemployed to the A-sector is
ruled out.3 Assuming that workers are risk neutral, an equilibrium condition
for the wage level of the low skilled is
WX =
1
ρ
. (12)
To avoid any interference between this assumption and utility in equation
(2) low skilled households are regarded as representative. Their composition
mirrors the proportion of unemployed low skilled workers in the region. When
firms and job seekers meet they split the matching rent by Nash bargaining
according to
arg max
WX
(WX − 0)β(J −WX)1−β, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, (13)
where J is the value of a filled vacancy from the perspective of a firm and β
is a parameter of bargaining power. This yields
WX = βJ (14)
as a second equilibrium condition. The final condition is found by noting
that posting of a vacancy costs firms γ (measured in units of the numeraire),
but gains them J with probability θ. Thus, in equilibrium one gets
J =
γ
θ
. (15)
Using (12), (14) and (15), the matching probabilities become
θ = B(βγ)1−η; ρ = B(βγ)−η. (16)
Thus, the number of unemployed workers in the first region can be rewritten
as
3Here one can think of a fixed and sector specific training investment that is sunk
after the initial decision and prevents workers from changing sectors (see Monfort and
Ottaviano, 2002, for an example). Modeling this explicitly brings no additional insight
and I omit it for simplicity.
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U = LX − S = V βγ − S = S
(
1
ρ
− 1
)
. (17)
Keeping in mind that the number of high skilled workers in a region equals
the number of local firms, the number of employed low skilled workers is4
S = KcXi = KR(σ − 1)ρ β
β + 1
, (19)
and (17) becomes
U = KRq; q ≡ (σ − 1) β
β + 1
[
1−B (βγ)−η] . (20)
q is a compound of parameters indicating the strength of the labor market
friction. Thus, there are three channels that influence the number of un-
employed workers in a region. First, unemployment rises if search frictions
grow stronger. Second, given a certain number of high skilled workers there
will be higher unemployment when firms are more profitable (higher R) and
low skilled workers can thus demand higher wages. Third, an increase in the
number of firms (higher K) raises job opportunities in the increasing returns
sector which makes more workers apply for “risky” jobs.
High-skilled wages Combining equations (10) and (6) with the result
from (20) and using the zero profit condition leads to
σR =
α (K + L−KRq)
K +K∗φ
+
αφ (K∗ + L∗ −K∗R∗q)
K∗ +Kφ
;
σR∗ =
αφ (K + L−KRq)
K +K∗φ
+
α (K∗ + L∗ −K∗R∗q)
K∗ +Kφ
.
(21)
with φ = τ 1−σ. Equation (21) shows the wage of mobile high skilled work-
ers R as a function of regional demand (represented by the nominators) and
supply (represented by the denominators). This is a system with two equa-
tions and two unknown and can be solved for high skilled wages in both
4To be able to use the equilibrium condition in (12) we need to assure that there are
still workers employed in the numeraire sector of region 1. A sufficient condition for this
to hold is
lˆ >
α(σ − 1)ρ
σ − αq
β
β + 1
, (18)
where lˆ is the fraction of low skilled workers in region 1 compared to the whole population
of the model economy.
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regions. These can then be used to calculate all the other short-run equilib-
rium variables for both regions, the price indices P and P ∗, utility I and I∗
and unemployment rates u = U
K+L
as well as u∗.
3 Agglomeration forces and unemployment
It follows from (8) that the differential in utilities of high-skilled households
between both regions is
I − I∗ = α ln(P ∗/P ) + (R−R∗). (22)
To write this equation as a function of the distribution of mobile workers
across regions, define k ≡ K/(K + K∗), l ≡ L/(K + K∗), and k∗ and l∗
respectively.5 The price part of equation (22) can then be written as
α ln(P ∗/P ) =
α
1− σ ln
[
kφ+ k∗
k + k∗φ
]
(23)
and the wage part
R−R∗ = Ω
[
k + l
k + k∗φ
− k
∗ + l∗
k∗ + kφ
+
αq
σ
(1 + φ)(k∗l − kl∗)
(k + k∗φ)(k∗ + kφ)
]
(24)
with
Ω =
(1− φ)ασ(k + k∗φ)(k∗ + kφ)
(σ + αq) [φσ + (1− φ)kk∗((αq − σ)φ+ σ + αq)] .
There are four general forces at work in the model. First, equation (23)
represents a supply linkage that arises because more firms in the core region
will decrease the local price level of the composite good produced by the in-
creasing returns sector. Second, there is a demand linkage because the bigger
population in the core has a positive effect on firm profitability, thus influenc-
ing the regional differential in high-skilled nominal wages. This is captured
in the first two terms in brackets of equation (24). Those forces work towards
agglomeration of activity in the increasing returns sector. Third, firms face
less competition in the smaller region because transport costs insulate them
to a certain extent from goods that are produced in the core. This competi-
tion effect is dispersive.
Finally, labor market frictions lead to an additional force. When there are
plenty of high-skilled workers in a region, many low-skilled workers decide to
try their luck in the risky sector. There is a direct and an indirect effect of
5This implies that k∗ = 1− k.
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Figure 1: Utility and unemployment differential at varying transport costs
rising unemployment on high-skilled wages. On the one hand it directly de-
creases local demand, which has a negative effect on wages (see the third term
in brackets of equation (24)). On the other hand, any regional differential
in high-skilled wages feeds back into unemployment through the bargaining
process of the low-skilled, which narrows the gap. This is captured by Ω.
In the short-run, high-skilled workers are assumed to be immobile between
regions. To illustrate the short-run equilibria of the model, the left panel
of figure 1 depicts the utility differential of high-skilled workers on the y-
axis and the distribution of high-skilled workers across the two regions on
the x-axis for three levels of transport costs.6 Starting with high transport
costs, the utility differential slopes downwards so that high-skilled workers
in the agglomeration are worse off that those in the periphery. For medium
transport costs we get this result only if agglomeration is strong. When
high-skilled workers are spread relatively even across regions, there is an
incentive to move into the larger region until a certain level of agglomeration
is reached. When transport costs are sufficiently low utility is always higher
6The other parameters are set to α = 0.3, σ = 5, β = 0.5, η = 0.5, γ = 5, B = 1 and
l = l∗ = 1.
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in the core.7 The right panel of figure 1 plots the regional unemployment
rate differentials arising with the various levels of transport costs and the
distribution of high-skilled workers. When the high-skilled worker count in
the core is high, the regional unemployment rate rises which increases the
differential. This effect can be amplified or dampened by the differential in
firm profitability (see equation (20)), but it cannot be reversed, as stated by
the following proposition:
Proposition 1. In a setting with two ex ante identical regions (l = l∗) the
equilibrium unemployment rate will be higher in the core. The differential
gets bigger as agglomeration increases.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Without any labor market frictions (q = 0) there is of course no un-
employment and the regional unemployment differential is zero. Reasoning
along similar lines as illustrated in Appendix A.1 leads to:
Proposition 2. The equilibrium unemployment rate differential increases
when search frictions increase.
4 Long-run equilibria
In the long-run, high-skilled workers move to the region that offers them
higher utility. An equilibrium is reached when there is no incentive for fur-
ther migration or when all mobile worker reside in the region yielding the
higher utility. As usual in the NEG literature, one might want to know
what happens to the long-run equilibria of the model as the costs of trans-
porting goods between regions fall.8 Pflu¨ger (2004) shows that the model
7This result seems to be quite unrealistic. It would be easy to introduce additional
spreading forces to omit complete agglomeration. An example would be a restriction to
the local housing market.
8We are usually not interested in models with agglomeration forces so strong that full
agglomeration is the only long-run equilibrium irrespective of the size of transport costs.
The proper ’no-black-hole’ condition is given by
l + l∗ >
σ + αq
σ − 1 .
Likewise, a ’no-unconditional-dispersion’ condition ensures that there is a certain range of
transport costs where agglomeration can occur in the long run:
l + l∗ <
(
σ + αq
σ − 1 + 1
)
σ
αq
.
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Figure 2: Bifurcation diagram and unemployment differential
with a quasi-linear specification exhibits a ’supercritical pitchfork bifurca-
tion’. There is a symmetric equilibrium as long as transport costs are suf-
ficiently high. When transport costs fall this equilibrium eventually breaks
and two asymmetric equilibria arise where mobile workers are partly concen-
trated. When transportation is very cheap, complete agglomeration in one
of the regions is the only stable equilibrium. Figure 2 shows the bifurcation
diagram of all possible stable equilibria for varying transport costs as well as
the respective unemployment differentials.
The point where the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable and the
two arms of the pitchfork appear (’break point’) can be found by setting
k = k∗ = 1/2 and solving for ∂(I − I∗)/∂k = 0. Assuming that both regions
are of symmetrical size (l = l∗) the corresponding level of transport costs can
be shown to be
φB = − (σ + αq)
2 − 2l(σ − 1)(σ + αq)
(σ + αq)(σ − αq) + 2(σ − 1)(σ + l(σ − αq)) . (25)
To see how the break point behaves when labor market frictions are intro-
duced, one can compare it to the case without any frictions. The break point
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with frictions lies at lower transport costs than the one without frictions if
φB
∣∣
q>0
> φB
∣∣
q=0
or
αq <
(
σ − 1
2σ − 1
)[
2l(2l(σ − 1)− 1)− 2σ − σ
2
σ − 1
]
holds true. Thus, if there is a sufficient number of immobile workers (large
l) the direct effect is large and search frictions work as a dispersing force.
For small l the indirect effect outweighs the direct one and the symmetric
equilibrium breaks at a higher level of transport costs.
To find the level of transport costs φS where complete agglomeration is
reached as a long-run equilibrium (’sustain point’), one can set k = 1 and
evaluate equation (22) at I − I∗ = 0. Because of the log-linear structure of
the utility differential, the solution can only be stated in implicit form:
σ + αq
1− σ lnφS =
[
l
(
1− αq
σ
)
+ 1
]
φS + l
(
1 +
αq
σ
)
φ−1S − (1 + 2l). (26)
It is nonetheless possible to evaluate the effect of increasing search frictions
on the location of the sustain point by totally differentiating expression (26)
with respect to φ and q, which gives
dφS
dq
=
αl
(
φ−1S − φS
)
+
ασ
σ − 1 lnφS
l(σ + αq)φ−2S −
σ(σ + αq)
σ − 1 φ
−1
S − l(σ − αq)− σ
. (27)
It can be shown that this differential is positive for all feasible combinations
of parameters. So we get:
Proposition 3. Introducing or increasing search frictions for the low-skilled
shifts the sustain point towards a lower level of transport costs. The effect on
the break point is ambiguous.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Figure 2 also indicates that the unemployment rate differential in long-
run equilibrium is bigger for small transport costs. There are two reasons for
that. First, falling transport costs increase the importance of the demand
linkage compared to the competition effect for any given k, increasing relative
profitability in the core.9 Second, the distribution of mobile workers becomes
9This does not necessarily hold true for very small transport costs (see Appendix A.3).
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less symmetric as more high-skilled workers move into the core. Both effects
widen the gap because now more immobile workers apply for jobs in the
X-sector of the larger region thus driving up the unemployment rate. This
result is summarized in the final proposition:
Proposition 4. Falling transport costs lead to a rise in the equilibrium un-
employment differential between core and periphery. This trend stops when
agglomeration is complete.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
5 Discussion
The above results are – as usual – driven by a set of highly stylized assump-
tions. Importantly, I assume throughout the model that high-skilled labor is
perfectly mobile in the long-run while low-skilled workers cannot move be-
tween regions at all. This assumption reflects the empirical regularity that
the high-skilled are typically more mobile than the low-skilled (Hunt, 2000).
Additionally, I assume that only the low-skilled face the risk of becoming un-
employed while high-skilled workers always find jobs. This is again a strong
simplification, but the empirical literature suggests that unemployment is a
more severe problem for the low-skilled (Nickell and Bell, 1996).
Like in other agglomeration models regional migration flows need not
level out all labor market disparities in the long run, but might even enforce
them. A stable equilibrium of unemployment differentials can arise where
the core region faces a higher unemployment rate than the periphery. This
result differs from the majority of other models in the NEG literature that
focus on cases where unemployment becomes lower in the core.
The present model therefore more closely resembles the classic outcome
of the migration model proposed by Harris and Todaro (1970). People there
decide between living in a rural area with safe but low income and moving to
an urban area with considerably higher income but the risk of staying unem-
ployed. In contrast, low-skilled workers are now mobile between sectors, not
regions. Strengthening agglomeration forces do not induce them to migrate
to more favorable locations, but to make more risky and potentially gainful
job search decisions. The unemployed can thus be said to be the victims of
“Great Expectations”.
Can the proposed correlation between agglomeration and unemployment
be observed in reality? The results are mixed. It has been shown that
unemployment rates in Europe are lower in core regions compared to the
periphery when looking at sufficiently aggregated data (see Suedekum, 2005).
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But this regularity typically breaks down when looking at more disaggregated
data(see vom Berge, 2011; Glaeser, 1998, pg. 146). It is tempting to suggest
that there are different kinds of frictions in local labor markets working into
opposite directions. The net effect might then depend on the regional context
under study. A detailed study of the interplay of those various frictions in
regional models sounds promising. This is a subject for further research.
6 Conclusion
This paper develops a solvable general equilibrium agglomeration model that
can account for unemployment differentials between regions. Labor market
frictions are introduced by assuming that firms in the increasing returns
sector face search costs when looking for (immobile) workers. Workers then
have to decide if they want to take the risk of applying for those jobs and
not getting an offer or work in a risk-free numeraire sector. I show that the
incentive to take a risk increases for immobile workers when more mobile
workers move into a region, because they can bid up their wage level. This
leads to an increase in the unemployment rate as a compensating differential.
This has two effects. First, rising unemployment reduces demand and
thus high-skilled wages. This constitutes an additional dispersion force. Sec-
ond, because any wage effects feed back into unemployment the high-skilled
wage differential between regions gets narrowed. This can have a dispersive
or accumulative effect on migration.
The occurrence of higher unemployment in core regions differs from the
majority of modern agglomeration models and more closely resembles the
classical result of Harris and Todaro (1970). One main difference to the
latter is that the present model explains how higher unemployment rates in
core cities might arise and also prevail without the need to assume ex ante
different regions.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Using equation (20) together with (21) and (24) the unemployment rate
differential can be written as
u− u∗ = q
[
k
k + l
R− k
∗
k∗ + l∗
R∗
]
= q · Ω˜ ·∆
where
Ω˜ ≡ [(σ + αq) (φσ + (1− φ)k(1− k)((αq − σ)φ+ σ + αq))]−1
∆ ≡ ασφ(1 + l + l
∗)
(k + l)(1− k + l∗)
[
k2(φ− 1)(2k − 3 + l − l∗) + k(φ(1 + l∗ − l) + 2l − 1)− l] .
Thus, to verify proposition 1 we need to show that
∂(u− u∗)
∂k
= q · ∂Ω˜
∂k
·∆ + q · ∂∆
∂k
· Ω˜ > 0 ∀ k > 1
2
.
Assuming l = l∗ and being aware of the BHC it can indeed be shown that in
this case Ω˜ > 0, ∆ > 0, ∂Ω˜
∂k
> 0 and ∂∆
∂k
> 0.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
This appendix proves that dφ
dq
in equation (27) is positive for all feasible
parameter values. First, note that the nominator in equation (27) is positive
for all φ ∈ ]0; 1]. Next, observe that for the left hand side (LHS) of equation
(26) we have lim
φ→0
LHS =∞, lim
φ→1
LHS = 0 and
∂LHS
∂φ
= −σ + αq
σ − 1 φ
−1 < 0,
∂2LHS
∂φ2
> 0.
The right hand side (RHS) of the equation is characterized by lim
φ→0
RHS =∞
and lim
φ→1
RHS = 0 with another root at
φ1 =
l(σ + αq)
l(σ − αq) + σ ,
an inflexion point at
√
φ1 > φ1 and
∂RHS
∂φ
= σ−1
(
l(σ − αq) + σ − l(σ + αq)φ−2) , ∂2RHS
∂φ2
> 0.
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Using the ’no-unconditional-dispersion’ condition, we get that
∂LHS
∂φ
∣∣∣∣
φ=0
>
∂RHS
∂φ
∣∣∣∣
φ=0
and
∂LHS
∂φ
∣∣∣∣
φ=1
<
∂RHS
∂φ
∣∣∣∣
φ=1
.
At φS we therefore get
∂LHS
∂φ
∣∣∣∣
φS
>
∂RHS
∂φ
∣∣∣∣
φS
or
l(σ + αq)φ−2S −
σ(σ + αq)
σ − 1 φ
−1
S − l(σ − αq)− σ > 0.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
The indirect effect of decreasing transport costs through migration directly
follows from Proposition 1. Using the terms from Appendix A.1 and assuming
l = l∗ it is easy to show that ∂(u − u∗)/∂φ = 0 for k = 1. If agglomeration
is incomplete (1 > k > 1/2) we get that
lim
φ→0
∂(u− u∗)
∂φ
> 0
lim
φ→1
∂(u− u∗)
∂φ
< 0 if 2l < σ/αq
with ∂2(u−u∗)/∂φ2 < 0 for all φ ∈ ]0; 1]. Although the derivative might
become negative for very low transport costs, we only need to show that
there is always a point φˆ > φS that yields ∂(u − u∗)/∂φ|φˆ > 0. Since the
supply linkage is always positive, we know that at the sustain point we have
R − R∗ < 0. This means that the point φ1 from Appendix A.2 satisfies the
condition φ1 > φS because here R − R∗ = 0. Evaluating the derivative at
this point yields
∂(u− u∗)
∂φ
∣∣∣∣
φ1
≥ 0 if 2l ≤ σ/αq.
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